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ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of banks in 14 major western 
countries under “regular conditions”. Using Bankscope data from more than 10,000 individual 
banks during 1997-2005, we test three hypotheses on the relation between past loan growth 
and loan losses, bank profitability, and bank solvency. Our empirical evidence supports the 
view that loan growth leads to a peak in loan loss provisions three years later, to a decrease in 
relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses reveal that loan growth 
also has a negative impact on risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan 
growth represents an important driver of bank risk. 
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 The activity of lending to customers represents a core function of banks, and is an integral 
part of the academic literature that explains why banks exist (see Diamond 1984, 
Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993). Some financial systems have been classified as “bank-based” 
because most of the funds needed for investment are channeled from households to firms 
through financial intermediaries (e.g. Levine 2002). Moreover, surveys like the Federal 
Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLOS) and the 
Bank Lending Survey of the European Central Bank have been set up to monitor banks’ 
lending behavior. Given the overall importance of bank lending from a micro- and 
macroeconomic viewpoint, there are two basic questions to be answered. First, which factors 
influence loan growth of banks? Second, what are the consequences of loan growth? This 
paper intends to provide empirical evidence on the second question, analyzing the link 
between loan growth and riskiness of individual banks. Needless to say that the recent 
problems in the U.S. subprime mortgage market have raised considerable attention to the link 
between loan growth and subsequent loan losses. 
 In addition to macro-economic factors (economic growth, monetary policy, etc.) that 
matter for all banks there are many bank-specific reasons for an increase or decrease in 
lending. Either new profitable lending opportunities may arise, like new loan products, 
lending channels, or lending segments (commercial vs. retail lending, internet-based lending, 
student loans, etc.), or the expansion to new geographical markets (other regions or countries) 
occurs. Mechanisms to increase lending are lowering interest rates, loosening credit standards, 
or both combined. Moreover, a bank may rely on organic internal growth or external growth 
by means of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In any of these cases, it is interesting to study 
the consequences of loan growth for bank risk, profitability, and solvency. Under the 
presumption that it is most likely that new loans will be granted to borrowers (i) that have 
previously been rejected, (ii) that were unknown or non-existent previously, (iii) that demand 
too low loan rates (too little collateral) relative to their credit quality, loan growth may have 
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an adverse impact on the overall risk of a bank. It is trivial to conclude that banks can increase 
their absolute interest income (and perhaps the absolute net interest result) by an increase of 
their lending volume, yet it is by far more difficult to assess how loan growth affects relative 
loan losses, the relative interest income, and the solvency of banks. Furthermore, this issue 
becomes even more complicated due to the intertemporal nature of the underlying economic 
relations, as well as bank-specific characteristics. 
 In this paper, we investigate whether past loan growth affects the riskiness of banks in 14 
major western countries under “regular conditions”. Using Bankscope data from more than 
10,000 individual banks during the period 1997-2005, we test the following three hypotheses 
(H1-H3), referring to the relation between loan growth and bank risk. Note that we control for 
bank- and country-specific effects in all analyses. First, we investigate if and how past loan 
growth affects loan losses. Given the experience that borrowers do not immediately default 
after they have received a bank loan (“loan seasoning”, see Berger and Udell 2004), we 
expect that loan growth materializes into an increase of loan loss provisions with a time lag of 
several years (H1). Second, we examine how loan growth influences the profitability of 
banks. If new loans are granted at a relatively lower rate, the average outstanding loan 
generates a lower interest income. Accordingly, the relative interest income is expected to 
decrease (H2). Third, we analyze the impact of loan growth on bank solvency. If banks fund 
loan growth mainly with new debt, the capital structure becomes more risky. We expect that 
loan growth leads to an overall decrease of the equity-to-total assets ratio (H3). The 
multivariate analyses of these hypotheses show that past loan growth is significantly 
positively related to loan losses and significantly negatively associated with bank profitability 
and solvency. In other words, loan growth represents an important determinant of the 
riskiness of banks. 
 Our paper contributes to the existent literature in several ways. First, most of the related 
studies have analyzed the aggregate link between business cycles, loan growth, and loan 
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losses, focusing on the macro-economic determinants of loan growth. Our paper goes one step 
further by analzying the consequences of loan growth for the riskiness of individual banks 
(controlling for macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, etc.). 
Second, in addition to analyzing the relation between loan growth and loan losses, we also 
examine the effects on bank profitability and bank solvency to obtain a broader picture of 
bank risk. Third, we examine the consequences of loan growth under “regular conditions”1, 
i.e. we exclude developing countries, emerging markets, and transition economies. Finally, 
this is the first paper that investigates the effects of loan growth by means of a large 
international micro-dataset, including important (but relatively different) banking sectors like 
the U.S. and Germany. 
 This study relates to the following literature. First, there are theoretical papers explaining 
changes in the credit policy of banks with reputation, interbank competition, and 
informational asymmetries (e.g., Rajan 1994, Ogura 2006, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006). 
Second, related empirical studies based on U.S. data provide evidence that loan growth may 
lead to a gradual increase of future loan losses (e.g. Sinkey and Greenawalt 1991, Clair 1992, 
Keeton 1999, Berger and Udell 2004). Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) analyze large U.S. 
banks during the period 1984-87 and find that the average past loan growth is significantly 
positively related to the contemporaneous loan loss rate. Interestingly, they detect a strong 
variation across banks which cannot be explained by macroeconomic variables. Clair (1992) 
uses individual bank data from Texas from the period 1976-90 to detect a negative impact of 
loan growth on nonperforming loans and the loan charge-off rate for the first year after a 
bank’s credit expansion, whereas for subsequent years, a positive relation is partly found. 
Keeton (1999) investigates the order and timing of potential effects between credit standards, 
loan growth, and loan losses in the U.S. at the aggregate level. For the period 1982-96, he 
                                                 
1 In this context “regular conditions“ refer to a stable economic and legal environment (with banking regulation 
and moderate macroeconomic cycles) which is typically observed in the countries included in our sample. 
Accordingly, Japan is excluded because of its relatively long and severe banking crisis. 
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provides evidence for the view that faster loan growth leads to higher loan losses. Berger and 
Udell (2004) examine the procyclicality of bank lending in the U.S. during 1980-2000. They 
find that credit standards are eased and more loans are granted as time passes since a bank’s 
last peak in loan losses. This result is interpreted as evidence in favor of the “institutional 
memory hypothesis” which claims that a deterioration in the ability of loan officers to 
recognize potential loan problems may lead to lower credit standards and an increase in 
lending. 
 In addition, there is some empirical research on the consequences of loan growth in 
western European countries as well. For example, Salas and Saurina (2002) analyze a large 
data set from Spanish commercial and savings banks from the period 1985-1997. Their main 
discovery is that loan growth (branch growth) of savings banks is significantly positively 
associated with loan losses three (four) years ahead. Moreover, Quagliariello (2007) 
investigates the relation between loan growth and loan loss provisioning at Italian banks 
during the period 1985-2002. He finds that both new bad loans and loan loss provisions are 
affected by the evolution of the economy. Furthermore, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) have 
analyzed an international sample of 45 countries from the Bankscope database to examine the 
determinants of loan loss provisioning and income smoothing of more than 1,000 large banks 
during the period 1988-1999. It turns out that on average, banks postpone provisioning in 
favorable cycle conditions until negative conditions set in. This result implies that loan loss 
provisioning magnifies the impact of economic cycles on banks’ income and capital, and 
should therefore be addressed in bank capital regulation. Iannotta et al. (2007) point out that 
bank ownership structure is an important determinant of risk and performance, inducing us to 
carefully control for bank (ownership) types. Finally, there are studies which analyze the 
relation between loan growth and banking crises in transition economies and developing 
countries (e.g., see Cottarelli et al. 2005, Kraft and Jankov 2005). 
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data set and 
reports summary statistics. Section 2 presents our main results from multivariate tests of the 
three hypotheses. Section 3 reports findings from further analyses on effects from mergers 
and acquisitions, differences between weakly and well capitalized banks, and on the risk-
adjusted income of banks. Results from tests of robustness are reported in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes and proposes avenues for future research. 
 
1. Description of the data 
 We analyze yearly balance sheet and income statement data for individual banks in major 
western countries during the period 1997-2005 stemming from Bankscope. We restrict our 
sample to banks from the U.S., Canada, and 12 European countries.2 The banking systems in 
these 14 countries, as measured by total banking assets in 2001, are among the 21 largest in 
the world, and we cover 11 out of the 12 largest banking systems. Furthermore, the sum of 
GDPs for 11 out of the 14 selected countries adds up to 74% of the cumulative GDP for the 
world’s 15 largest economies in 2001. Japan, emerging Asian markets, developing countries 
and transition economies are intentionally excluded from our sample because our goal is to 
analyze loan growth under “regular conditions”.3 Lending booms and banking crises in 
developing countries and transition economies such as China, India or Eastern Europe have 
been analyzed in other studies.4 Since our focus is on bank lending to the private sector, we 
exclude investment banks, development banks, and other similar institutions. Moreover, the 
raw data set represents an unbalanced panel, and banks are dropped if the key variables (total 
loans, changes in loan loss provisions, interest income, and total equity) are not observed in at 
least five consecutive years. Finally, banks with total assets below 1,000,000 USD are 
                                                 
2 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
3 As Bhattacharya (2003) shows, Bankscope data for emerging economies (e.g. India) has poor quality anyway. 
4 Cottarelli et al. (2005) analyze loan growth in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Kraft and Jankov (2005) focus 
on credit growth in Croatia. 
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considered as atypical and excluded as well. Table 1 reports the main characteristics of the 
data set. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Panel A displays the number of banks remaining in the final data set and compares this 
to the total number of banks in each country published in OECD statistics. In most of the 
countries, a substantial fraction of the relevant banks in existence is covered by our data, 
amounting to an overall coverage of 62.4%. Note that the representativeness measured by the 
fraction of total assets covered is even higher because Bankscope claims to cover at least 90% 
of total banking assets per country. 
Panel B summarizes the main variables employed in the subsequent empirical analyses 
(referring to bank-year observations), as well as macroeconomic control variables (referring 
to country-year observations). We measure loan growth (LGt) as the percentage change in the 
amount of total customer loans from the year t-1 to year t. Lending to other financial 
institutions is not included as this is a distinct line of business that implies a different risk-
return structure. The mean (median) annual loan growth amounts to 11.76% (7.93%). Note 
that the data set includes some extreme observations from banks which reduced their lending 
to customers by 37% during one year as well as banks that expanded total customer loans by 
244%.5 Loan losses (LL1t) are measured as the fraction of the annual change in loan loss 
provisions established in the year t relative to total customer loans in year t-1 (in percentage 
points). Since borrowers rarely default during the first year after a new loan has been granted, 
and in order to disentangle losses of longer existing loans from contemporaneous changes in 
total lending, we prefer this measure to taking total customer loans from year t in the 
denominator. We are aware of two problems related to this measure of relative loan losses: 
                                                 
5 We address the issue of extreme loan growth in Section 3.1 and Section 4.2 in more detail. 
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First, loan loss provisions which have been established in one year may be suspended in 
subsequent years if the borrower recovers from financial distress, which causes a netting 
effect. Our data does not allow us to control for this effect, i.e. loan losses are systematically 
underestimated, which creates a conservative bias in our analysis. Second, as the allocation to 
loan loss reserves reduces the amount of total customer loans in the balance sheet, there may 
be compensating effects with our measure of loan growth. However, we do not expect any 
material distortions to be caused by this because changes in loan loss provisions are relatively 
small (median of 0.36%) compared to typical rates of loan growth (median of 7.93%). 
Initially, all items from the balance sheets and income statements in the Bankscope data 
base were denominated in U.S. Dollars. To eliminate any distortions caused by currency 
fluctuations, we calculate loan growth rates as well as loan losses from numbers that were re-
converted to the local currency with the appropriate year-specific exchange rate. 
The fraction of total interest income over total customer loans represents the relative 
interest income (RIIt). Note that, given that the income statement reflects first-year earnings 
from lending on a prorated basis, the annual interest income from new loans is likely to be 
smaller than the annual interest income of loans in the second year and beyond because new 
loans are granted throughout all calendar months. Therefore, we use the average of total 
customer loans from year t-1 and year t as the denominator of RIIt.6 The relative interest 
income, with a median of 9.51%, may be upward biased because of interest-related payments 
due to guarantees granted that are not part of total customer loans. For this reason, RII 
exhibits a maximum of 54.63%. 
The equity-to-total assets ratio (ETA) represents a typical measure of bank solvency, 
with values between 2.22% and 38.52% and a median of 8.68%. The equity ratio indicates a 
bank’s ability to cover any kind of unexpected losses (due to lending or other activities). 
                                                 
6 Thereby, we employ the total loan volume from year t-1 plus 50% of the volume of new loans granted during 
year t, implicitly assuming a uniform distribution of loan granting throughout the year. 
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Therefore, banks are required to meet a minimum regulatory capital ratio of 8% under the 
Basel I and Basel II regimes. In fact, most of the banks hold a considerable capital buffer 
above the 8% ratio. Note that we consider values for all variables below the 0.5%-quantile 
and above the 99.5%-quantile to be outliers, and exclude these observations from all analyses. 
In the subsequent analyses we control for banks size (using the total amount of customer 
loans) and differentiate by bank specialization: bank holdings & holding companies 
(S_BHHC; 1,376 banks), commercial banks (S_COMM; 6,333 banks), cooperative banks 
(S_COOP; 1,164 banks), medium & long term credit banks (S_MLTC; 19 banks), real estate 
and mortgage banks (S_REMB; 64 banks), and savings banks (S_SAV; 1,272 banks). Finally, 
we use data from the OECD main economic indicators database to consider macroeconomic 
effects in each country and year. Specifically, we include the GDP growth rate 
(GDP_GROW), the inflation rate (INFLAT), the 10-year government bond yield 
(INT_LONG), and the term premium of interest rates (TERM = INT_LONG – 3-month 
interest rate). All macro variables are scaled in percentage points and described in Panel B of 
Table 1. GDP growth exhibits a mean of 2.6% and a maximum value of 8.4% (Luxembourg, 
1999), whereas the highest inflation rate (15.9%) was observed in Norway (2001). Ten-year 
government bond yields were on average 4.61%, and values for the term premium range from 
-1.82% to 2.88%. By including these macroeconomic data series, as well as indicator dummy 
variables for each country, we are able to capture the heterogeneity due to the specific cross-
country composition of our data set. 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
2.1. Loan growth and loan losses 
 In this section we analyze the impact of past loan growth on contemporaneous loan losses. 
As stated in H1, we intend to test whether rapid loan growth in the past is associated with a 
gradual decrease of the average credit quality in a bank’s loan portfolio. We start with a 
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graphical analysis of relative loan losses (LL1, as defined above) and past loan growth (LG) 
for the two biggest economies in our sample, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 The median of LL1 from all banks in year t in the U.S. (Panel A) and Germany (Panel B) 
is compared with the median loan growth rate in year t-3. We consider the lag 3 of loan 
growth because, according to bankers’ experience, if borrowers default at all, it would occur 
at the earliest in the second or third year after the loans have been granted. Panel A displays a 
clear co-movement of the two variables in the U.S. during the period 2001–2005, indicating 
that the monotonously decreasing rate of loan growth between 1999 and 2002 may have led to 
a decline in relative loan loss provisions three years later. Evidence for Germany displayed in 
Panel B is less clear, but again, a parallel movement of LL1t and LGt-3 can be observed during 
the years 2002-2005. Note that these findings from aggregate numbers might be exclusively 
driven by business-cycle effects, and that appropriate multivariate econometric models are 
needed to disentangle banks exhibiting high loan growth rates from moderately growing ones.  
 In a next step, we continue our analysis with the following regression model: 
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 First, since almost all values of LL1 are higher than zero, we take the natural logarithm of 
this variable (LOGLL1), to obtain a (-∞,+∞) range of possible values, and thus implicitly 
exclude net releases of loan loss reserves from our analysis (LL1 ≤ 0; 1,711 observations). As 
contemporaneous changes in loan loss provisions highly depend on a bank’s overall risk 
characteristics and are accordingly related to past loan losses, we include a lagged dependent 
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variable LOGLL1t-1. Again, the fact that most of the loan losses typically are not realized 
before the second year after the loan has been granted (“credit vintage”) leads us to include 
lag 1-4 of loan growth as explanatory variables. If indeed banks expand their total amount of 
loans by granting credit to lower-quality borrowers, as we expect, we should detect a positive 
relation between loan losses and past loan growth. 
 To control for individual bank size (SIZEt), we include the logarithm of its total customer 
loans (LOGTCLt). The GDP growth rate (GDP_GROWt) or alternatively the inflation rate 
(INFLATt) serve as macroeconomic control variables (MACROt). Loan losses are expected to 
increase during economic downturns, i.e. the relation with the GDP growth rate should be 
negative. A high inflation rate could indicate an economic recession as well; however, up to a 
certain threshold (which e.g. Khan and Senhadji, 2001, have estimated to range between 1 and 
3 percent for industrial countries), inflation is expected not to slow down economic growth. 
Furthermore, a decrease in the long-term interest rate (INT_LONGt) lowers the interest 
expenses and thus reduces a borrower’s probability to get into financial distress (and vice 
versa) – we therefore expect a positive relation with loan losses. To deal with bank 
specialization- and country-specific effects, we further include indicator dummy variables for 
each bank type and country, as well as a constant term αit. The models are estimated as OLS 
regressions with Huber-White robust standard errors, taking into account potential problems 
from heteroscedasticity and clustering of observations within banks.7 
 Table 2 displays results for changes in loan loss provisions from the baseline regressions. 
Models (1) and (2) include different macroeconomic control variables. Model (3) drops the 
lagged dependent variable to confirm its explanatory power. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
                                                 
7 Robustness tests indicate that all results on H1-H3 are confirmed if we apply fixed-effects and random-effects 
panel estimators. Additionally, to control for any distortion caused by the intertemporal nature of our regression 
model (dynamic panel bias), we also consider a dynamic panel estimator (system GMM as proposed by Blundell 
and Bond 1998) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction and obtain similar results. 
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 As Hypothesis H1 suggests, we find a substantial, positive, and highly significant impact 
of LGt-2 and LGt-3 on contemporaneous loan losses. In models (1) and (2), the coefficient for 
LGt-4 is also significantly positive, but amounts to roughly one third of the coefficient for  
LGt-3, which exhibits the strongest effect, as we expected. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Salas and Saurina (2002), who discover a positive impact of lag 3 of loan growth 
on total loan loss reserves at Spanish banks. However, since they measure loan losses 
differently, the magnitude of their results can not be directly compared to our findings. The 
coefficient for LGt-3, which is approximately 0.003 in our model (3), means that an increase of 
loan growth by 20% (= one standard deviation, starting from the mean of 55 basis points, see 
Table 1) in year t-3 causes the ratio of relative loan losses to increase by 3.4 basis points to 
58.4 basis points.8 The effect becomes stronger if we jointly consider loan growth all three 
previous years (instead of year t-3 only). Note that the negative influence of LGt-1 is due to a 
technical effect since TCLt-1 are included in the numerator of LGt-1 as well as in the 
denominator of LL1t. We cannot detect a significant impact of bank size (measured by 
LOGTCLt) on relative loan losses, and the remaining macroeconomic control variables show 
the expected sign and are highly significant: Higher GDP growth rates and higher inflation 
have a negative influence on loan losses, which implies that inflation rates were mainly below 
the aforementioned threshold, whereas an increase in 10-year government bond yields causes 
loan loss provisions to rise. With respect to bank specialization, our expectation is confirmed 
that real estate and mortgage banks, which mainly grant secured loans with relatively low 
default risk, exhibit substantially lower loan losses. This effect is smaller in absolute values, 
but still significantly negative to the 1%-level, for cooperative and savings banks.9 
                                                 
8 Recall that these are average losses on all loans, i.e. they result from previously and newly granted loans. 
9 Using a separate regression model for each bank specialization leads to the same findings regarding the 
influence of loan growth on loan losses. 
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 Subsequently, we refine our analysis by classifying banks into three categories according 
to their past loan growth. We distinguish whether the growth rate of a bank’s total customer 
loans in t-3 was below the 33.3%-quantile (lower tercile) in the respective country and year, 
above the 66.7%-quantile (upper tercile) or in between (mid tercile). We allow banks to move 
among these categories from year to year. Comparing the median of loan losses, three years 
after each bank was allocated into one of these groups, we find that relative loan losses of 
banks from the mid tercile (0.316%) are slightly higher those of banks from the lower tercile 
(0.304%). Most importantly, banks from the upper growth tercile in t-3 exhibit substantially 
higher relative loan losses (0.391%), which confirms the overall results from Table 2.10 To 
gain deeper insight into the relation between loan losses and past loan growth, we apply the 
previous regression model to banks in each growth tercile (as defined above). Results are 
presented in Table 3.11  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 The expected impact of control variables on LL1t is confirmed for all three categories. In 
contrast, the impact of past loan growth on contemporaneous loan losses is more 
differentiated. While the coefficient for LGt-2 for slowly growing banks is comparable in 
terms of magnitude to what we observe in the overall regression, loan losses of banks 
exhibiting moderate past growth are much more sensitive to changes in LGt-3, resulting in an 
increase of coefficients by factor 8, compared to Table 2. For rapidly growing banks which 
already have high loan loss rates, the sensitivity declines relative to the mid tercile, but 
remains significantly positive at the 10%-level. One possible explanation for this finding 
                                                 
10 Wilcoxon ranksum tests confirm that all differences in relative loan losses between growth terciles are 
significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. 
11 Since these groups (terciles) are calculated for different years and due to the unbalanced panel structure of our 
data, the number of observations or clusters in each category is not exactly the same. 
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might be that these high loan growth rates are mainly driven by external growth through bank 
mergers or acquisitions. Note that we reconsider this issue in Section 3.1 in more detail. 
Another rationale could be that banks increase their lending business to a certain extent by 
accepting lower-quality borrowers. For further growth, they must rely on other strategies, 
such as underpricing the competitors’ loan rates, to attract borrowers that are not necessarily 
characterized by a relatively lower creditworthiness. 
 Summarizing, we find strong support for Hypothesis H1 by discovering a positive and 
highly significant relation between past loan growth and contemporaneous loan losses at the 
individual bank-level. In particular, the sensitivity of loan losses to loan growth is highest for 
banks in the mid growth tercile, meaning that the increase in banks’ riskiness due to loan 
growth is less pronounced for banks exhibiting very low or very high growth rates. 
 
2.2. Loan growth and interest income 
 In this section, we examine whether new loans that have been granted in order to expand a 
bank’s credit portfolio are priced at a lower rate than loans granted by banks aiming to 
maintain or even reduce their current credit exposure, as suggested by Hypothesis H2. Note 
that a risk-based loan pricing policy, combined with the positive relation between past loan 
growth and loan losses detected in Section 2.1, would require banks to charge higher rates for 
these additional loans compared to the existing credit portfolio.12 However, the competition 
for borrowers may induce banks to underprice the loan rates of competing banks in order to 
attract new customers (see Ogura 2006). 
 We use the following regression model to explain the absolute change of the relative gross 
interest income of each bank (ΔRIIt) by the contemporaneous rate of loan growth (LGt) and a 
set of control variables: 
 
                                                 
12 We will come back to the impact of loan growth on risk-adjusted interest income in Section 3.3. 
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 The relative interest income in the year t (RIIt as defined in Section 1) highly depends on 
RIIt-1 since all rates of loans that have been granted before t–1 and do not mature in the 
meantime are included in both variables. That is why we take the first difference (ΔRIIt = RIIt 
– RIIt-1) to measure the changes in relative interest income, the variable we are actually 
interested in. Note that ΔRIIt only measures the change in average interest income from the 
entire loan portfolio, i.e. it is impossible to extract the fraction of the interest income that 
stems from newly granted loans. The contemporaneous loan growth (LGt) represents the main 
explanatory variable, and according to Hypothesis H2, we expect the relative interest income 
to decrease for rapidly growing banks, and thus a negative impact of LGt on ΔRIIt. Again, we 
control for individual bank size (SIZEt) by including the natural logarithm of its total 
customer loans (LOGTCLt). As macroeconomic control variables (MACROt) we include the 
inflation rate (INFLATt), or alternatively the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROWt), which also 
controls for an economy’s credit demand. During economic upturns, the latter is usually 
higher than in recessions, and banks can then more easily maintain or increase their interest 
margin than in recessions. The inflation rate should have a positive impact on ΔRIIt, as banks 
are required to demand higher nominal loan rates in order to maintain the profitability of their 
loan portfolio if inflation rates rise. It is essential to control for the long-term interest level 
(INT_LONGt), as this variable is expected to be the main macroeconomic driver of interest 
income and it also stands for aggregate credit supply. Alternatively to INT_LONGt, we use 
the term premium TERMt, which is expected to be negatively related to ΔRIIt since a large 
difference between long-term and short-term interest rates allows for an increasing maturity 
transformation by banks, and funding long-term loans by means of short-term deposits 
facilitates the reduction of loan rates. To deal with bank specialization- and country-specific 
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effects, again we include indicator dummy variables for each bank type and country as well as 
a constant term αit. The models are estimated as OLS regressions with Huber-White robust 
standard errors, taking into account potential problems from heteroscedasticity and clustering 
of observations within banks. Table 4 displays regression results for the change in the relative 
gross interest income. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
 We detect a negative and highly significant impact of LGt on ΔRIIt, which represents 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2 claiming that loan growth leads to a reduction in relative 
interest income. For example, the magnitude of the coefficient of approximately –0.005 in 
models (1) and (2) predicts the relative interest income to decline by 0.15% if a bank decides 
to expand its loan portfolio by 30%. The significantly positive coefficient for LOGTCLt 
indicates that large banks are generally more prone to increase loan rates than smaller banks 
are. As macroeconomic variables, both GDP_GROWt and INFLATt exhibit a significantly 
positive impact on the relative interest income, as expected. Finally, the positive coefficient 
for INT_LONGt and the negative influence of TERMt confirm our predictions about the 
impact of these variables.  
 Subsequently, we analyze bank type- and country-specific effects in more detail. For the 
analyses reported in Table 5, we rely on the model (1) from Table 4. The analysis in Panel A 
differentiates between bank specializations whereas Panel B provides separate regression 
results for each of the 14 countries.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
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 It turns out that our previous results are mainly confirmed. For commercial banks and 
savings banks as well as for 8 out of the 14 countries considered, we detect a significantly 
negative influence of loan growth on loan losses. Interestingly, cooperative banks, with their 
significantly positive coefficient for LGt, seem to increase loan rates in a credit expansion. 
This may be due to the specific ownership and borrower structure of these banks and could 
also cause the significantly positive relation for Germany, where 734 of 1,332 banks in our 
sample are credit cooperatives. The coefficients for LOGTCLt , INFLATt and INT_LONGt 
show their expected sign with few exceptions. In summary, with the exception of credit 
cooperatives, our analysis provides clear evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2, i.e. loan growth 
leads to a decrease in the relative interest income of banks. 
 
2.3. Loan growth and bank solvency 
 Our previous analyses reveal that past loan growth leads to an increase of 
contemporaneous loan losses and to a decrease of the relative interest income. Taken together, 
both effects indicate that loan growth increases the riskiness of banks. We now investigate if 
loan growth leads to an overall decline in bank solvency, as stated in Hypothesis H3. We 
measure bank solvency by means of the equity-to-total assets ratio for each bank-year 
observation.13  
 Before turning to the analysis, some additional explanations are in order. Potentially, one 
might think that it is trivial to assume that loan growth always implies a decline of the equity-
to-total assets ratio (as stated in Hypothesis H3). However, the following example shows that 
this is not the case. Consider a bank with outstanding loans of 1,000 and no other assets, 
which exhibits an equity-to-total assets ratio of 10%, i.e. equity amounts to 100. Assume that 
these loans yield, on average, an interest margin of 1%, net of refinancing costs and all other 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, we have measured bank solvency using the equity-to-total customer loans ratio. Note that all 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the remainder of this section. 
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expenses, with there being no other income or cost types. Thus, during one year, total net 
earnings add up to 10, and if no dividends are paid (which is not unusual, for example, in case 
of savings banks), the equity rises to 110. This corresponds to an increase of the equity-to-
total assets ratio from 10% to 11%. However, this increase in equity allows the bank to extend 
lending by 10% to 1,100 during the same year, maintaining the equity-to-total assets ratio at 
the 10%-level. These alternatives clearly show that loan growth is not necessarily associated 
with a decrease of the equity-to-total assets ratio. Higher growth rates can similarly be 
financed by banks with higher net interest margins, other income types (e.g. fee, commission 
and trading income), or by means of recapitalizations. Therefore, loan growth does not 
categorically lead to a decline in capital ratios. 
 We begin with an aggregate analysis of the median of loan growth, calculated across all 
banks in the U.S. and Germany throughout the period 1998-2005. Figure 2 plots the median 
of loan growth and the median of changes in the equity-to-total assets ratio (as described in 
Section 1) from year t-1 to year t. Both Panel A (U.S.) and in particular Panel B (Germany) 
exhibit an inverse relation between loan growth and bank solvency. Note that since the total 
amount of loans (TCLt) is also part of the denominator in the equity-to-total assets ratio, there 
can be some technical relation between these two variables. On the other hand, financing loan 
growth without additional funds would simply lead to a substitution of assets (e.g. decrease of 
cash and security holdings, increase of lending) and not cause this technical effect. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
 In the multivariate analysis, we regress absolute changes in the equity-to-total assets ratio 
of each bank in the year t (ΔETAt) on contemporaneous loan growth and several control 
variables using the following model: 
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 We do not consider the level of the equity-to-total loans ratio as our dependent variable 
because the technical relation due to loan growth mentioned above would be even higher for 
this measure of bank solvency. Instead, we calculate the first difference ΔETAt = ETAt – 
ETAt-1 since capital ratios in subsequent years are usually highly correlated, and we are only 
interested in the relation between changes in equity and loan growth. The main explanatory 
variable is the contemporaneous loan growth (LGt). According to Hypothesis H3, ΔETA is 
expected to be negative for banks exhibiting rapid loan growth since these banks may not be 
able to increase their capital proportionally to the rise in total assets (TAt). We also control for 
individual bank size (SIZEt) by including the natural logarithm of the amount of total 
customer loans (LOGTCLt). The GDP growth rate (GDP_GROWt) or alternatively the 
inflation rate (INFLATt) serve as macroeconomic control variables (MACROt). During 
economic upturns, banks usually realize higher profits that may be retained in order to 
enhance their capitalization. We therefore expect GDP_GROWt to be positively associated 
with ΔETAt. Typically, inflation causes prices of balance sheet items to rise, but this does not 
affect a bank’s equity. Due to this effect, the equity-to-total assets ratio is expected to 
decrease in times of high inflation. Again, as control variables for the interest rate 
(INTERESTt), we include the 10-year government bond yield (INT_LONGt) and the term 
premium (TERMt = INT_LONGt minus 3-month interest rate). We deal with bank 
specialization- and country-specific effects by including indicator dummy variables for each 
bank type and country as well as a constant term αit. Finally, the models are estimated as OLS 
regressions with Huber-White robust standard errors taking into account potential problems 
from heteroscedasticity and clustering of observations within banks. Table 6 summarizes the 
regression results for the equity-to-total assets ratio. 
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Insert Table 6 here 
 
 Most important, with regard to contemporaneous loan growth, we detect a negative impact 
on ΔETAt, which is at the 1%-level statistically different from zero. In models (1) to (3), the 
coefficient exhibits a magnitude of approximately –0.025, meaning that a 30%-expansion of 
total customer loans causes the equity-to-total assets ratio to decrease by 0.75%. Large banks 
are more prone to increase their solvency, as the coefficients for LOGTCLt is significantly 
positive. This may be related to the ownership structure of these large banks, which allows for 
a higher fraction of profits to be retained. As expected, more favorable economic conditions, 
measured by higher GDP_GROWt (coefficient significantly positive) or lower INFLATt 
(coefficient significantly negative), lead to an increase in the equity-to-total assets ratio. The 
10-year government bond yield exhibits a relatively strong positive impact on bank solvency. 
As discussed above, this is possibly due to high long term interest rates that allow banks to 
realize a higher interest income, which they can use to build capital buffers and to increase 
their equity-to-total assets ratio. The impact of the term premium (TERMt) is statistically 
significant and negative, but the very small coefficient lacks economic significance. 
 In addition, we have differentiated the preceding analyses across bank types and countries 
(details not reported here). Essentially, we find a negative relation of loan growth and bank 
solvency for all five bank types, with the strongest impact of loan growth on commercial and 
savings banks’ solvency, whereas the effect is weakest again for cooperative banks. This may 
be caused by a high flexibility for cooperative banks to increase total equity through the 
admission of new cooperative partners. The analysis on a country level confirms the 
significantly negative relation between loan growth and the equity-to-total assets ratio, which 
we already detected for the full sample, for 12 out of 14 countries, which represents clear 
support in favor of Hypothesis H3. 
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3. Further empirical analyses 
3.1. Internal versus external growth of banks 
 So far, we have not taken into account the reasons for loan growth. On the one hand, a 
bank may increase the loan volume because of new lending opportunities such as new lending 
segments or geographic expansion (internal growth). On the other hand, the loan portfolio 
may increase as a consequence of a takeover or bank merger (external growth). Since the 
propositions in Hypotheses H1-H3 are implicitly based on the idea of internal growth, we 
have to control for possible distortions caused by the M&A activity in the banking industry. 
Unfortunately, our data does not include bank- and year-specific information on M&A 
transactions so that we are unable to directly control for this effect. Instead, we construct an 
indicator variable MERGEt that takes the value 1 if a bank’s total equity increases by more 
than 40.0%, which corresponds to the 95%-quantile of the equity growth rate distribution. 
Otherwise, the value of MERGEt is 0.14 After specific accounting operations, the equity of 
two merging companies is usually pooled15, and an increase by more than 40.0% within one 
year is very unlikely to result from either retained profits or a regular increase of capital. 
 In the remainder, we repeat the tests of hypotheses H1-H3 but include the indicator 
variables MERGEt (lags 0-4), which we interact with the respective lagged value of loan 
growth. Estimation results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, we define MERGE based on the 95%-quantile of loan growth and obtain similar results. We 
also considered a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a bank has extreme equity or loan growth in one year 
(otherwise 0) and sum up this variable over all years for each bank which allows us to distinguish between banks 
which were involved been involved in M&A at least once or never. We then re-estimate regression models 1-3 to 
test H1-H3 for the both sub-samples of banks. This approach leads to results similar to the reported ones. 
15 Likewise, the equity of the acquiring and the acquired company is consolidated. 
 22
 First, as Panel A displays, the analysis how past loan growth relates to contemporaneous 
loan losses leads to interesting results. The interaction term LGt-1 X MERGEt-1 exhibits a 
significantly negative and large coefficient. Consequently, M&A activity is predicted to lead 
to lower loan losses in the short run. The impact of the other lagged interaction terms is less 
surprising: Coefficients are negative, and summed up with the (positive) coefficients of LGt-1, 
LGt-2,…, the net influence of past external loan growth through M&A activity is significantly 
weaker than that in the case of internal growth. The overall coefficients of loan growth are  
–0.0020 for the first lag, 0.0010 for the second, 0.0012 for the third, and –0.0001 for the 
fourth. Accordingly, there still exists a moderate positive impact which, as we expected, is 
relatively weak for banks that grew through M&A. In other words, our previous findings on 
H1 are not biased by M&A transactions in the banking industry. 
 Second, as stated by H2, the impact of contemporaneous loan growth on relative gross 
interest income (ΔRIIt) is analyzed in Panel B. Similar to Panel A, we find a strong 
compensating effect between LGt (significantly negative) and LGt X MERGEt (significantly 
positive), resulting in a net coefficient of 0.0086. In contrast to the results described in Section 
2.2, we now observe a positive effect of loan growth through M&A on relative interest 
income, meaning that acquired banks exhibit, on average, higher loan rates than acquirers. 
 Third, Panel C reports the corresponding results for the impact of loan growth on bank 
solvency as stated in Hypothesis H3. We find an almost perfectly compensating effect 
between LGt and LGt X MERGEt, meaning there is no impact of external loan growth on 
bank solvency. We would expect this finding, especially for the case that two equally-well 
capitalized banks merge, resulting in a proportional increase of equity, total loans, and total 
assets. In light of these results, we conclude that all of the relations uncovered in previous 
analyses are downward biased due to banks exhibiting extremely high external growth rates. 
These persist even when we control for external growth in the manner described above. 
However, banks relying on external growth strategies through M&A experience by far weaker 
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detrimental consequences regarding loan losses, income and solvency. Most importantly, if 
we exclude banks involved in M&A activities, our results for H1-H3 become even stronger. 
 
3.2. Differentiation by bank capitalization 
 The literature as well as banking practice has repeatedly outlined fundamental differences 
in bank behavior between poorly and well capitalized banks. For example, undercapitalized 
banks may pursue a strategy like “gambling for resurrection”, fostering high growth rates in 
the short-run, and accepting a potential increase in loan losses in the future. Therefore, we 
differentiate between weak and strong banks in the following analyses to take a deeper look 
on the effects regarding all three hypotheses. Banks are classified into three categories 
according to their equity-to-total assets (ETA) ratio. Observations with an ETA ratio below 
the 33.3%-quantile (lower tercile – weak banks) in the respective country and year, 
observations with an ETA ratio above the 66.7%- quantile (upper tercile – strong banks), and 
observations exhibiting an ETA ratio in between are analyzed separately. Banks are allowed 
to move among these categories from year to year. 
 In Panel A of Table 8, we refine our analysis regarding the effects of past loan growth on 
contemporaneous loan losses (H1) with respect to the three ETA terciles described above. 
Controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, and country effects, Panel A reveals that the 
positive impact of past loan growth (LGt-k) on relative loan losses (LOGLL1t) is strongest for 
weakly capitalized banks while it is considerably less pronounced for better capitalized banks.  
Panel B reveals significant negative effects of loan growth on relative interest income only for 
banks in the lower and upper ETA terciles. Undercapitalized banks may rely on an 
“underpricing” strategy as their poor solvency does not allow for the acceptance of higher-risk 
borrowers. On the other hand, banks with a high ETA ratio are able to grow by setting low 
loan spreads, taking advantage of their higher capital buffers that allow a temporary cutback 
in interest income. Moreover, note that the control variables show the expected sign. Finally, 
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Panel C indicates that a negative relation between loan growth and changes in equity is 
relatively weak for the lower ETA tercile and increases for better capitalized banks. This is 
possibly due to regulatory or economic restrictions which do not allow weakly capitalized 
banks an unlimited further reduction of their anyway poor capitalization. 
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
 An additional explanation for these results may be that strong banks are well-capitalized 
because they have developed appropriate management skills to obtain a sufficient 
compensation for risk (loan pricing policy and other lending terms) or to avoid future loan 
losses (loan exposure and credit portfolio management). Accordingly, the poor capitalization 
of weak banks may stem from a lacking ability to generate as “healthy” loan growth such as 
for the case of better capitalized banks. This implies that loan growth is especially dangerous 
for undercapitalized banks because their capital buffer (which is low anyway) is more 
sensitive to loan growth. Consequently, monitoring the loan growth of weak institutions may 
be valuable for banking supervisors. 
 
3.3. Loan growth and risk-adjusted interest income 
 We now complete our analysis of the effects of loan growth on loan losses and interest 
income with a simultaneous test of Hypotheses H1 and H2. So far we have analyzed the 
effects of loan growth on loan losses (Section 2.1) and interest income (Section 2.2) 
separately. In this section, we intend to analyze whether loan growth also relates to risk-
adjusted interest income. If this is not the case, loan growth does not represent a potential 
danger for bank solvency, because risk-adjusted loan pricing and consequent loan monitoring 
ensure “healthy” loan growth. However, if loan growth is significantly and negatively related 
to measures of risk-adjusted income, we can conclude that banks are growing by accepting 
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lower-quality borrowers, granting loans at rates below the competitive loan rate or both. Note 
that problems for bank solvency may be most severe in the last case. 
 We examine the ratio of relative changes in loan loss provisions to relative net interest 
income (LOGLL1t/RNII).16 This ratio allows for a joint test of the influence of loan growth on 
loan losses and interest income. More specifically, we consider two different definitions of the 
ratio in Model 1 and 2, which differ in the time horizon over which RNII is measured. In 
Model 1, the ratio is based on lag 3 of the relative net interest income (RNIIt-3), because 
previous findings indicate that loan growth leads to a peak in loan losses three years later. In 
Model 2, the denominator of the ratio is the average relative net interest income for each bank 
(ARNII), calculated as the mean of RNII over the four preceding years. Explanatory variables 
are loan growth (LG), measured over the same time horizon as the dependent variable (Model 
1: Lag 3 of loan growth LGt-3; Model 2: Average loan growth over the four preceding years 
ALG), the natural logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL) to control for bank size, the 
GDP growth rate, and the 10-year government bond yield (INT_LONGt) to control for 
macroeconomic effects, as well as indicator dummy variables for bank specializations and 
countries.  
 
Insert Table 9 here 
 
 It is striking that both LGt-3 in Model 1 and ALG in Model 2 of Table 9 exhibit highly 
significant and positive coefficients. These results suggest that higher loan growth leads to an 
increase of loan loss provisions per unit of net relative interest income. Thus, rapidly growing 
banks are not able to obtain a sufficient compensation for the additional risks taken. Control 
variables indicate that in general, larger banks exhibit a more favorable loss-income ratio, 
                                                 
16 Loan loss provisions LOGLL1t are included as natural logarithm and defined as in Section 1. The relative net 
interest income (RNII) is calculated by dividing total interest income minus total interest expenses by the 
average of total customer loans (TCL) in the years t–1 and t. 
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which is also the case in times of high inflation. Moreover, note that including the relative net 
interest income from financial statements in the denominator of the ratio has the advantage 
that a bank’s actual refinancing costs in each year are directly included. However, we are well 
aware of the problem that due to the time lag between the numerator, denominator, and the 
measure of loan growth, effects may also partially be driven by changes in refinancing 
structure or costs. 
 Therefore, we check the robustness of this finding in a second analysis, using an 
alternative measure, the risk-adjusted income (RAIt), which is calculated as relative interest 
income (RIIt) minus the 5-year swap rate for each country and year (assumed banks’ 
refinancing costs), processing costs of 0.50 percentage points (assumed value), and the 
relative loan losses in t+3:17 RAIt = RIIt – SWAP_5t – 0.50 – LLt+3. The first difference of this 
variable (ΔRAI = RAIt – RAIt-1) is taken as dependent variable and to be explained by loan 
growth, controlling for bank size and specialization, macroeconomic effects and countries.  
 For brevity, regression results are not reported in the paper. We find a negative and highly 
significant coefficient for LGt, indicating once again that the risk-adjusted income is likely to 
decrease at banks exhibiting high loan growth rates. Note that this result is in line with our 
findings from Table 9, although the dependent variable is very different (Table 9: Level of net 
returns in the denominator of a ratio; here: First difference of net returns).18 As discussed 
earlier, this finding implies that banks are growing either by granting loans to borrowers that 
subsequently cause an increase of loan losses, by intentionally setting loan rates below an 
adequate risk-adjusted level, or both. In summary, these additional tests provide support for 
the view that loan growth has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income of banks. 
 
                                                 
17 An alternative risk-adjusted income measure (RAI) based on average loan losses over the years t+2 to t+4 
leads to comparable results. 
18 The variables LOGLL1/RNII and RAI are positively correlated. However, the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient is 0.16, indicating that each of the measures includes a considerable amount of non-redundant 
information. 
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4. Tests of robustness 
4.1. Two-way linkages between loan growth and loan losses 
 In all previous tests of Hypothesis H1, we have examined the one-way relation between 
past loan growth and contemporaneous loan losses. Subsequently, we study whether our 
findings remain robust if we explicitly consider intertemporal two-way linkages between loan 
growth and loan losses. On the one hand, we have shown that loan growth can lead to an 
increase in future loan losses. On the other hand, banks facing big loan losses may be forced 
to reduce future loan growth for several reasons (shareholder activism, reputation, accounting 
policies, risk of bank runs, banking regulation, etc.). For example, Keeton (1999) analyzes 
aggregate time-series of loan growth and loan losses for the U.S. and finds that there are 
important two-way linkages. In addition, Berger and Udell (2004) also examine the relation 
between peaks in loan losses, credit standards and loan growth. Specifically, we estimate a 
modified two-equation vector autoregressive model (VAR) with the logarithm of changes in 
contemporaneous loan loss provisions and loan growth as endogenous variables. The right-
hand side variables (identical in both equations) are the logarithm of the cumulative relative 
loan losses over the period t-4 to t-1, the cumulative loan growth from t-4 to t-1, a bank size 
proxy, bank specialization dummies, and country dummies.19 Table 10 summarizes the 
results. 
 
Insert Table 10 here 
 
 This analysis yields several interesting results. First and most important, our previous 
results on the relation between loan growth and future loan losses (Hypothesis H1) remain 
                                                 
19 We have also estimated a VAR model including lags 1, 2, 3, and 4 of loan growth and loan losses and obtain 
very similar results. However, relative loan loss provisions exhibit strong serial correlation which leads to a 
multicollinearity problem. As a solution, we consider cumulative variables. Cumulative loan growth is calculated 
as the product of the annual growth factors minus one (geometric growth) while cumulative relative loan loss 
provisions are calculated as the sum of the annual loan loss provisions.  
 28
robust if we include lags of loan losses. Second, lagged loan losses have indeed a significantly 
negative impact on contemporaneous loan growth. As discussed above, an increase in loan 
losses may force a bank to reduce loan growth in the future. Third, it turns out that 
contemporaneous loan losses can be better explained than contemporaneous loan growth in 
terms of goodness of fit (R2). In other words, the impact of loan growth on future loan losses, 
as stated in Hypothesis H1 and analyzed in Section 2.1, is stronger than the inverse relation, 
underlining the economic relevance of the hypothesis. Finally, as expected, both loan growth 
and loan losses exhibit positive serial correlation. Summarizing, previous results are 
confirmed although we find two-linkages (which is consistent with results from studies 
analyzing aggregate data) between loan growth and loan losses. 
 
4.2. “Abnormal” loan growth and riskiness of banks 
 So far, we have analyzed the consequences of raw loan growth for the riskiness of 
individual banks. To study the robustness of our previous results, we now define “abnormal” 
(or “excess”) loan growth LG1t as the difference between an individual bank’s loan growth in 
year t (LGt) and the median loan growth of all banks from the same country and year: ALGt = 
LGt – med(LGct). In addition, the variable DLGt takes the value of –1 if LGt is below the 
33.3%-quantile (in the lower tercile) of loan growth for all banks from the same country and 
year, the value of 1 if is is above the 66.7%-quantile (upper tercile), and the value of 0 if it is 
mid tercile. The main motivation for using this alternative measure is to zoom in on the part 
of loan growth that may be caused by bank-specific effects while macro-economic conditions 
account for the average loan growth in a country and year. In a first step, we compare 
contemporaneous loan losses for banks that exhibit positive abnormal loan growth for three 
subsequent years (ALG > 0 in each of the years) with that of banks that exhibit negative 
abnormal loan growth in three subsequent years (ALG < 0 in each of the years). This 
comparison indicates that loan losses are signficantly higher (p-val. < 0.01) at banks which 
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grow faster than other banks from the same country and year. In a second step, we carry out 
multivariate regression analyses to test the hypotheses H1-H3 with our alternative measures 
of loan growth. Results are summarized in Table 11. 
 
Insert Table 11 here 
 
 Most important, it can be seen that the results from our previous analyses of gross loan 
growth are confirmed for all hypotheses using both new measures of abnormal growth. 
Interestingly, even the models based on the categorial variable DLG display considerable 
explanatory power. Second, note that the coefficients for the abnormal loan growth ALG 
(displayed in regression models (1)) are very similar to those estimated in our previous 
analyses. We conclude that our baseline results remain robust if we consider two alternative 
definitions of an individual bank’s loan growth. 
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5. Conclusions 
 We investigate if and how past loan growth affects the riskiness of banks from 14 major 
western countries under “regular conditions”. Using Bankscope data from more than 10,000 
individual banks during 1997-2005, we test three hypotheses to provide evidence on the 
relation between past loan growth and loan losses, bank profitability, and bank solvency, 
controling for bank-specific and country-specific effects. 
 First, with respect to H1 we find that past loan growth has a positive and highly significant 
influence on subsequent loan losses with a maximum in the third year. This evidence based on 
a large international sample of individual banks is consistent with findings from related 
studies that analyze the aggregate link between loan growth and loan losses in single 
countries. Second, with respect to H2, we detect that loan growth also leads to a decline in the 
relative interest income of banks. This finding holds for most countries and supports the view 
that new loans which add to the existing credit portfolio tend to be underpriced (relative to the 
their default risks). Granting loans at rates that do not compensate for default risk may help in 
fostering loan growth. However, such a strategy decreases the interest income of the average 
outstanding loan and, in turn, lowers the overall bank profitability ceteris paribus. Third, the 
test of H3 reveals that loan growth is significantly negatively related to bank solvency. In 12 
out of 14 countries, higher loan growth leads to lower capital ratios, indicating a decrease of 
bank solvency. 
 In further analyses, we provide evidence that our baseline results are considerably stronger 
if we exclude banks involved in M&A activities. Moreover, the effects of loan growth on loan 
losses, relative interest income, and bank solvency differ considerably with regard to bank’s 
capitalization. Simultaneous tests of H1 and H2 yield that loan growth leads to a deterioration 
in a bank’s risk-return structure. Finally, although we find intertemporal two-way linkages 
between loan growth and loan losses, the aforementioned positive relation between past loan 
growth and contemporaneous loan losses remains robust and turns out to be economically 
 31
more important than the inverse relation. In another robustness test, we consider abnormal 
loan growth instead of raw loan growth and obtain highly similar results. 
 This paper has several implications. First, bank managers should check whether the 
additional income from loan growth represents an adequate compensation for the additional 
risk taking. Second, banking supervisors can monitor loan growth in order to get early 
warning signals about the riskiness of individual banks (e.g., Curry, Fissel, and Ramirez 
2006). Further research may take a broader perspective in analyzing the effects of bank 
growth on bank risk, distinguishing between an increase of on-balance sheet activities 
(interest income) and a shift to off-balance sheet activities (non-interested income). Finally, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether credit ratings and market-based credit risk 
indicators like stock prices and credit spreads (from bond and credit derivatives markets, see 
e.g. Lown and Morgan 2006) of large banks are complementary to accounting-based, dynamic 
bank activity measures like loan growth. 
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Figure 1 
Contemporaneous loan losses and past loan growth 
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Notes: These graphs display the median of loan growth in the year t-3 and the median of relative loan losses, 
defined as the fraction of changes in total loan loss provisions in t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1, 
in percentage points. Values across all banks in the U.S. and in Germany are presented in panel A and B. Loan 
growth is scaled on the left axis; relative loan losses are scaled on the right axis. 
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Figure 2 
Loan growth and the equity-to-total assets ratio over the business cycle 
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Panel B: Germany 
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Notes: These graphs display the median of loan growth, and the median of changes from t-1 to t in the equity-to-
total assets ratio of a bank in percentage points. Values across all banks in the U.S. and in Germany are presented 
in panel A and B. Loan growth is scaled on the left axis; the changes in the equity-to-total assets ratio are scaled 
on the right axis. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Bankscope and OECD statistics (2001) 
Country No. of banks 
in data set 
No. of banks 
(OECD) 
Fraction of banks 
covered in data set 
Belgium 29 118 24.6% 
Canada 30 48 64.6% 
Denmark 73 117 62.4% 
France 203 507 40.0% 
Germany 1,332 2,434 54.7% 
Italy 467 830 56.3% 
Luxembourg 21 189 11.1% 
Netherlands 17 93 18.3% 
Norway 26 152 17.1% 
Spain 87 281 31.0% 
Sweden 22 126 17.5% 
Switzerland 41 350 11.7% 
United Kingdom 71 385 18.4% 
United States 7,809 8,129 96.1% 
Total 10,228 16,397 62.4% 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variable Notation No. of obs Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Relative loan losses (in %) LL1 60,135 0.55 0.36 0.67 -1.02 8.68
Loan growth (in %) LG 60,135 11.76 7.93 20.42 -36.95 243.76
Relative interest income (in %) RII 60,135 10.11 9.51 3.24 4.03 54.63
Equity-to-total assets (in %) ETA 70,278 9.17 8.68 3.56 2.22 38.52
Total assets (in bill. USD) TA 70,278 3.62 0.22 34.42 0.0041 1,565.65
Total customer Loans (in bill. USD) TCL 70,278 1.96 0.15 15.82 0.0016 675.51
GDP growth rate (in %) GDP_GROW 70,278 2.60 2.5 1.34 -0.2 8.4
Inflation rate (in %) INFLAT 70,278 1.99 2.1 0.87 -1.9 15.9
10-year government bond yield (in %) INT_LONG 70,278 4.86 4.61 0.7 2.1 7.05
Term premium of interest rates (in %) TERM 70,278 1.49 1.33 1.15 -1.82 2.88
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Table 2 
Regression results for changes in loan loss provisions 
 
Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LOGLL1t-1  0.601375 *** 0.000  0.597702 *** 0.000   
LGt-1  -0.000615  0.133  -0.000248  0.553 0.000248  0.602
LGt-2  0.001364 *** 0.000  0.001283 *** 0.001 0.002452 *** 0.000
LGt-3  0.001888 *** 0.000  0.001917 *** 0.000 0.003005 *** 0.000
LGt-4  0.000629 ** 0.013  0.000544 ** 0.032 0.002699 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt  0.002606  0.576  -0.002259  0.635 0.015767 * 0.061
GDP_GROWt  -0.061806 *** 0.000   -0.126000 *** 0.000
INFLATt     -0.164180 *** 0.000   
INT_LONGt  0.325026 *** 0.000  0.405538 *** 0.000 0.230798 *** 0.000
S_BHHC  -0.000932  0.958  -0.003728  0.833 0.011456  0.698
S_COOP  -0.200554 *** 0.000  -0.208628 *** 0.000 -0.456961 *** 0.000
S_MLTC  -0.108000  0.411  -0.115466  0.375 -0.531656 ** 0.045
S_REMB  -0.802929 *** 0.000  -0.789404 *** 0.000 -2.016473 *** 0.000
S_SAV  -0.150205 *** 0.000  -0.153600 *** 0.000 -0.459563 *** 0.000
+ country dummies        
Constant  -3.764025 *** 0.000  -3.880508 *** 0.000 -6.677734 *** 0.000
No. of obs.  18,283    18,283  18,585  
No. of clusters  8,718    8,718  8,863  
Adj. R²  0.515    0.516  0.273  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of loan losses in t (LOGLL1), defined as the 
fraction of the changes in total loan loss provisions in t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1. 
Explanatory variables are the lags 1-4 of loan growth (LG), and in models (1) and (2) the lagged dependent 
variable. We control for bank-specific effects using the logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL), and 
indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas 
Bank Holdings & Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium 
& Long Term Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1 and Savings Banks 
by S_SAV=1. As macroeconomic control variables, the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW), the inflation rate 
(INFLAT) and the 10-year government bond yield (INT_LONG) are included, as well as country dummies. P-
values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
 38
Table 3 
Regression results for changes in loan loss provisions by past loan growth terciles 
 
Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  Lower tercile: 
Low growth in t-3 
 Mid tercile: 
Moderate growth in t-3 
 Upper tercile: 
High growth in t-3 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LOGLL1t-1  0.589860 *** 0.000  0.588965 *** 0.000  0.620102 *** 0.000
LGt-1  0.000421  0.589  -0.001589 ** 0.034  -0.000909  0.133
LGt-2  0.001965 *** 0.006  0.000871  0.225  0.000628  0.277
LGt-3  0.001208  0.584  0.015848 *** 0.000  0.000726 * 0.060
LGt-4  0.000402  0.478  0.001380 ** 0.040  0.000487  0.141
LOGTCLt  -0.005548  0.491  -0.002338  0.745  0.013747 * 0.077
GDP_GROWt  -0.083662 *** 0.000  -0.055558 *** 0.003  -0.036721 ** 0.024
INT_LONGt  0.290450 *** 0.000  0.286410 *** 0.000  0.372145 *** 0.000
S_BHHC  0.000302  0.993  -0.029075  0.290  0.021075  0.467
S_COOP  -0.159705 *** 0.000  -0.277958 *** 0.000  -0.179914 *** 0.000
S_MLTC  -0.300320 * 0.091  -0.201367  0.564  0.196356  0.556
S_REMB  -1.169470 *** 0.000  -0.781940 *** 0.000  -0.502115 *** 0.000
S_SAV  -0.099862 ** 0.012  -0.260532 *** 0.000  -0.100896 *** 0.009
+ country dummies         
Constant  -3.205843 *** 0.000  -3.678003 *** 0.000  -4.24623 *** 0.000
No of obs.  5,719   6,343   6,221  
No of clusters  4,085   4,633   4,321  
Adj. R²  0.506   0.524   0.506  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of loan losses in t (LOGLL1), defined as the 
fraction of changes in total loan loss provisions in t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1. Explanatory 
variables are the lags 1-4 of loan growth (LG), as well as the lagged dependent variable. We control for bank-
specific effects using the logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL) and indicator dummy variables for each 
bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings & Holding Companies 
are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium & Long Term Credit Banks by 
S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. As 
macroeconomic control variables, the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW) and the 10-year government bond yield 
(INT_LONG) are included, as well as country dummies. This analysis differentiates whether the growth rate of a 
bank’s total loans in t-3 (versus t-4) was below the 33.3%-quantile (in the lower tercile) of loan growth for all 
banks in the respective country and year, above the 66.7%-quantile (upper tercile), or in between (mid tercile). P-
values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
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Table 4 
Regression results for the relative gross interest income 
 
Dep. Var.: ΔRIIt  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt  -0.005376 *** 0.000  -0.005118 *** 0.000  -0.006070 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt  0.038956 *** 0.000  0.031015 *** 0.000  0.021100 *** 0.000
INFLATt  1.014770 *** 0.000  0.770179 *** 0.000    
GDP_GROWt       0.190246 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt  0.829046 *** 0.000      
TERMt     -0.383842 *** 0.000  -0.453709 *** 0.000
S_BHHC  -0.048438 *** 0.000  -0.027508 ** 0.042  -0.082030 *** 0.000
S_COOP  0.189280 *** 0.000  0.203136 *** 0.000  0.182999 *** 0.000
S_MLTC  0.677270 *** 0.000  0.676528 *** 0.000  0.723114 *** 0.000
S_REMB  0.335139 *** 0.000  0.377282 *** 0.000  0.372411 *** 0.000
S_SAV  0.078957 *** 0.001  0.096312 *** 0.000  0.049450 ** 0.049
+ country dummies         
Constant  -6.982515 *** 0.000  -1.885689 *** 0.000  -0.772027 *** 0.000
No of obs.  49,907   49,907   49,907  
No of clusters  10,228   10,228   10,228  
Adj. R²  0.175   0.166   0.104  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute change from t-1 to t of the relative gross interest income (RII, 
defined as the fraction of total interest income in t over the average of total customer loans in t-1 and t). 
Explanatory variables are the contemporaneous loan growth (LG) and the logarithm of total customer loans 
(LOGTCL). We control for further bank-specific effects using indicator dummy variables for each bank 
specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings & Holding Companies are 
denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium and Long Term Credit Banks by 
S_MLTC=1, Real Estate & Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. As 
macroeconomic control variables, the inflation rate (INFLAT), the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW), the 10-year 
government bond yield (INT_LONG) and the term premium of interest rates (TERM = 10-year government 
bond yield minus 3-month interest rate) for the respective country are included, as well as country dummies. P-
values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
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Table 5 
Regression results for the gross interest income by bank specialization and country 
Panel A: Differentiation by bank specialization 
Dep. Var.: ΔRIIt  (1) 
Bank Hold. & Holding Comp. 
 (2) 
Commercial Banks 
 (3) 
Cooperative Banks 
 (4) 
Savings Banks 
 (5) 
Other Bank Types 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt  -0.001358  0.447  -0.008368 *** 0.000  0.014643 *** 0.000  -0.012309 *** 0.005  -0.014545 * 0.061
LOGTCLt  0.034240 *** 0.000  0.079652 *** 0.000  0.123210 *** 0.000  -0.020954  0.117  0.086045 *** 0.003
INFLATt  1.328151 *** 0.000  1.171158 *** 0.000  1.894241 *** 0.000  0.518516 *** 0.000  0.155605  0.200
INT_LONGt  0.454099 *** 0.000  0.331556 *** 0.000  3.264461 *** 0.000  1.407583 *** 0.000  1.264561 *** 0.000
+ country dummies              
Constant  -6.337742 *** 0.000  -5.492707 *** 0.000  -19.916050 *** 0.000  -8.062200 *** 0.000  -6.792741 *** 0.000
No of obs.  6,919   29,978    6,002    6,575   433  
No of clusters  1,376   6,333    1,164    1,272   83  
Adj. R²  0.275   0.166    0.534    0.199   0.161  
 
Panel B: Differentiation by country 
Dep. Var.: ΔRIIt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Explanatory var. Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Italy Luxemb. Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland UK USA 
LGt 0.038203 
(0.083)* 
-0.023480 
(0.003)*** 
-0.048852 
(0.022)** 
0.002623 
(0.837) 
0.012851 
(0.000)*** 
-0.018778 
(0.000)*** 
-0.051596
(0.030)** 
0.002161 
(0.892) 
0.037364 
(0.019)** 
-0.026985 
(0.089)* 
-0.060415 
(0.043)** 
-0.029696 
(0.006)*** 
0.004154 
(0.681) 
-0.006813 
(0.000)*** 
LOGTCLt 0.020251 
(0.890) 
-0.016337 
(0.644) 
0.216318 
(0.067)* 
-0.064667 
(0.287) 
0.091237 
(0.000)*** 
0.181476 
(0.000)*** 
-0.070995
(0.804) 
0.255474 
(0.171) 
-0.059198 
(0.407) 
0.341535 
(0.027)** 
0.136036 
(0.209) 
0.368053 
(0.023)** 
0.068071 
(0.290) 
0.075626 
(0.000)*** 
INFLATt 3.014990 
(0.000)*** 
0.190923 
(0.158) 
1.929353 
(0.000)*** 
1.654094 
(0.000)*** 
1.331789 
(0.000)*** 
3.082695 
(0.000)*** 
-0.616011
(0.030)** 
0.661891 
(0.000)*** 
-0.096809 
(0.000)*** 
2.399024 
(0.000)*** 
0.495150 
(0.001)*** 
-0.479278 
(0.368) 
-0.134867 
(0.626) 
1.433725 
(0.000)*** 
INT_LONGt 2.283942 
(0.000)*** 
0.105766 
(0.632) 
1.383884 
(0.000)*** 
2.443625 
(0.000)*** 
3.037176 
(0.000)*** 
3.745677 
(0.000)*** 
0.949067 
(0.107) 
0.588167 
(0.275) 
2.117780 
(0.000)*** 
2.439923 
(0.000)*** 
1.915281 
(0.000)*** 
3.642797 
(0.000)*** 
-0.641767 
(0.073)** 
0.242805 
(0.000)*** 
+ special. dummies               
Constant -17.85482
(0.000)*** 
-1.128583 
(0.425) 
-12.41409 
(0.000)*** 
-14.17686 
(0.000)*** 
-15.84251 
(0.000)*** 
-28.48722 
(0.000)*** 
-2.223616
(0.534) 
-7.635122 
(0.046)** 
-11.74827 
(0.000)*** 
-23.66419 
(0.000)*** 
-11.14887 
(0.000)*** 
-14.03395 
(0.000)*** 
1.816959 
(0.370) 
-5.538868 
(0.000)*** 
No of obs. 149 170 400 1011 7,139 2,374 99 83 131 458 101 194 368 37,230 
No of clusters 29 30 73 203 1,332 467 21 17 26 87 22 41 71 7,809 
Adj. R² 0.178 0.030 0.432 0.392 0.392 0.672 0.171 0.175 0.576 0.480 0.479 0.235 0.000 0.277 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute change from t-1 to t of the relative gross interest income (RII, defined as the fraction of total interest income in t over the average of 
total customer loans in t-1 and t). Explanatory variables are the contemporaneous loan growth (LG) and the logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL). The analysis 
differentiates between bank specializations by using separate regression models (1) to (5) in panel A whereas models (1) to (14) in panel B differentiate between countries. The 
model (5) in panel A (“Other Bank Types”) analyzes Medium & Long Term Credit Banks and Real Estate / Mortgage banks. In panel B, we control for bank-specific effects 
using indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization. As macroeconomic control variables, the inflation rate (INFLAT) and the term premium of interest rates (TERM = 
10-year government bond yield minus 3-month interest rate) are included, as well as country dummies in panel A. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard 
errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
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Table 6 
Regression results for the equity-to-total assets ratio 
 
Dep. Var.: ΔETAt  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt  -0.025112 *** 0.000  -0.025048 *** 0.000  -0.025171 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt  0.087137 *** 0.000  0.086021 *** 0.000  0.086614 *** 0.000
INFLATt  -0.070403 *** 0.000  -0.082730 *** 0.000    
GDP_GROWt       0.024942 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt  0.048860 *** 0.000    0.056830 *** 0.000
TERMt     -0.017614 *** 0.001    
S_BHHC  -0.112861 *** 0.000  -0.111689 *** 0.000  -0.110650 *** 0.000
S_COOP  0.153834 *** 0.000  0.153720 *** 0.000  0.153894 *** 0.000
S_MLTC  -0.085816  0.412  -0.084826  0.417  -0.084706  0.417
S_REMB  -0.254918 *** 0.000  -0.252234 *** 0.000  -0.253816 *** 0.000
S_SAV  -0.009521  0.660  -0.008719  0.687  -0.007725  0.721
+ country dummies         
Constant  -0.374458 *** 0.001  -0.084101  0.412  -0.578991 *** 0.000
No of obs.  60,050   60,050   60,050  
No of clusters  10,228   10,228   10,228  
Adj. R²  0.129   0.128   0.128  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute change of the equity-to-total assets ratio from t-1 to t (ΔETA). 
Explanatory variables are the contemporaneous loan growth (LG) and the natural logarithm of total customer 
loans (LOGTCL). We control for further bank-specific effects using indicator dummy variables for each bank 
specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings & Holding Companies are 
denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium & Long Term Credit Banks by 
S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. As 
macroeconomic control variables, the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW), the inflation rate (INFLAT), the 10-year 
government bond yield (INT_LONG), and the term premium of interest rates (TERM = 10-year government 
bond yield minus 3-month interest rate) for the respective country are included, as well as country dummies. P-
values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 
 42
Table 7 
Interaction effects from mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry 
Panel A: Loan growth and loan losses (H1) 
Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val. 
LOGLL1t-1 0.602720 *** 0.000
LGt-1 0.000701  0.231
LGt-1 X MERGEt-1  -0.002704 *** 0.000
LGt-2 0.001347 ** 0.019
LGt-2 X MERGEt-2 -0.000345  0.577
LGt-3 0.002920 *** 0.000
LGt-3 X MERGEt-3 -0.001730 *** 0.001
LGt-4 0.000927 *** 0.006
LGt-4 X MERGEt-4 -0.001008 ** 0.021
LOGTCLt 0.004135  0.379
GDP_GROWt -0.061343 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt 0.324132 *** 0.000
Constant -3.791370 *** 0.000
No. of obs. 18,204   
No. of clusters 8,658   
Adj. R² 0.516   
 
Panel B: Loan growth and interest income (H2) 
Dep. Var.: ΔRIIt  
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt -0.020220 *** 0.000
LGt X MERGEt 0.028860 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt 0.035244 *** 0.000
INFLATt 1.021699 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt 0.837091 *** 0.000
Constant -6.887036 *** 0.000
No. of obs. 49,906   
No. of clusters 10,228   
Adj. R² 0.205   
 
Panel C: Loan growth and bank solvency (H3) 
Dep. Var.: ΔETAt  
Explanatory Var. Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt -0.048254 *** 0.000
LGt X MERGEt 0.051621 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt 0.064975 *** 0.000
INFLATt -0.052241 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt 0.095386 *** 0.000
Constant -0.288125 *** 0.005
No. of obs. 60,049   
No. of clusters 10,228   
Adj. R² 0.287   
 
Notes: These tables report results for hypotheses H1-H3 taking into account the M&A activity of banks. M&A 
effects are considered by an interacted indicator variable MERGE (= 1 if a bank’s total equity increases by more 
than 40.0%, which corresponds to the 95% percentile of the equity growth rate distribution). All regressions also 
include bank specialization and country dummies (not reported here). P-values are calculated from Huber-White 
robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1%; 5%, and 10%-level. 
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Table 8 
Differentiation of regression results by banks’ capitalization 
 
Panel A: Regression results for changes in loan loss provisions 
Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  Lower tercile: 
Low ETA in t-3 
 Mid tercile: 
Moderate ETA in t-3 
 Upper tercile: 
High ETA in t-3 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LOGLL1t-1  0.578027 *** 0.000  0.554029 *** 0.000  0.655990 *** 0.000
LGt-1  -0.000812  0.242  -0.000791  0.255  -0.000361  0.623
LGt-2  0.001559 *** 0.009  0.001421 ** 0.033  0.000895  0.196
LGt-3  0.002544 *** 0.000  0.001914 *** 0.000  0.001135 ** 0.038
LGt-4  0.000822  0.102  0.001041 ** 0.012  0.000023  0.957
LOGTCLt  -0.003662  0.617  0.009903  0.225  0.013942  0.135
GDP_GROWt  -0.071826 *** 0.000  -0.078556 *** 0.000  -0.028976  0.157
INT_LONGt  0.300154 *** 0.000  0.362790 *** 0.000  0.303525 *** 0.000
+ special./country dummies         
Constant  -4.001158 *** 0.000  -4.055786 *** 0.000  -3.511551 *** 0.000
No of obs.  6,293   6,366   5,624  
No of clusters  3,510   3,846   3,154  
Adj. R²  0.512   0.494   0.541  
 
Panel B: Regression results for the relative gross interest income 
Dep. Var.: ΔRII  Lower tercile: 
Low ETA in t 
 Mid tercile: 
Moderate ETA in t 
 Upper tercile: 
High ETA in t 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt  -0.008333 *** 0.000  -0.001964 * 0.093  -0.006434 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt  0.004284  0.631  0.020209 *** 0.008  0.082727 *** 0.000
INFLATt  1.006689 *** 0.000  1.019895 *** 0.000  1.014140 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt  0.875277 *** 0.000  0.789472 *** 0.000  0.833566 *** 0.000
+ special./country dummies         
Constant  -7.173966 *** 0.000  -6.684929 *** 0.000  -7.085848 *** 0.000
No of obs.  16,877   16,858   16,172  
No of clusters  5,142   6,089   4,812  
Adj. R²  0.177   0.202   0.160  
 
Panel C: Regression results for the equity-to-total-assets ratio 
Dep. Var.: ΔETA  Lower tercile: 
Low ETA in t 
 Mid tercile: 
Moderate ETA in t 
 Upper tercile: 
High ETA in t 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt  -0.014539 *** 0.000  -0.019789 *** 0.000  -0.033562 *** 0.000
LOGTCLt  -0.069457 *** 0.000  -0.075712 *** 0.000  -0.081792 *** 0.000
INFLATt  -0.053631 *** 0.000  0.007611  0.287  0.136127 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt  0.157609 *** 0.000  0.050336 *** 0.000  -0.118645 *** 0.000
+ special./country dummies         
Constant  -0.343539 *** 0.001  0.017526  0.870  1.110838 *** 0.000
No of obs.  20,137   20,234   19,679  
No of clusters  5,361   6,463   5,174  
Adj. R²  0.098   0.122   0.155  
 
Notes: These analyses differentiate whether a bank’s equity-to-total-assets ratio (ETA) was below the 33.3%-
quantile (in the lower tercile) of ETA for all banks in the respective country and year, above the 66.7%-quantile 
(upper tercile), or in between (mid tercile). Panel A tests H1 and explains the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
loan losses in t (LOGLL1), as defined above, by the lags 1-4 of loan growth (LG), as well as the lagged 
dependent variable. In Panel B (testing H2) and Panel C (testing H3), respectively, the absolute change from t-1 
to t of the relative interest income (ΔRII), or the absolute change of the equity-to-total-assets ratio (ΔETA) are 
explained by the contemporaneous loan growth rate (LG). In all panels, we control for bank-specific effects 
using the logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL) and indicator dummy variables for each bank 
specialization. As macroeconomic control variables serve the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW) or the inflation 
rate (INFLAT), as well as the 10-year government bond yield (INT_LONG) and country dummies. P-values are 
calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
 44
Table 9 
Regression results for risk-adjusted relative interest income 
 
  (1) 
Dep. var: 
3tRNII
LOGLL1
−
 
 (2) 
Dep. var: 
ARNII
LOGLL1 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LGt-3  0.001594 *** 0.000     
ALG    0.003066 *** 0.000 
LOGTCL  -0.163256 * 0.093  -0.081671 *** 0.000 
INFLATt  -0.136099 *** 0.002  -0.130534 *** 0.000 
INT_LONGt  0.465930  0.134  -0.005648  0.818 
S_BHHC  0.279927  0.103  0.109436 *** 0.000 
S_COOP  0.269146  0.631  -0.200331 *** 0.009 
S_MLTC  -1.532496  0.252  -1.556831 ** 0.016 
S_REMB  -1.948880 *** 0.001  -2.260130 *** 0.000 
S_SAV  0.041517  0.907  -0.229888 *** 0.000 
+ country dummies      
Constant  -1.909309 ** 0.035  -0.335600  0.139 
No of obs.  28,531   18,562   
No of clusters  10,105   8,859   
Adj. R²  0.004   0.119   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the natural logarithm of loan losses (LOGLL1) in t to the relative 
net interest income (RNII) in the preceding years. The denominator is measured alternatively as RNIIt-3 in model 
(1), or as the average relative net interest income ( )/4RNIIRNIIRNIIRNIIARNII 4t3t2t1t −−−− +++=  in model (2). 
Explanatory variables are loan growth (LG) in the time period that corresponds to the measure of RNII used, and 
the natural logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL). We control for further bank-specific effects using 
indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas 
Bank Holdings & Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium 
& Long Term Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1, and Savings Banks 
by S_SAV=1. As macroeconomic control variables, the inflation rate (INFLAT) and the 10-year government 
bond yield (INT_LONG) are included, as well as country dummies. P-values are calculated from Huber-White 
robust standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
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Table 10 
Modified VAR model for loan losses and loan growth 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var.:  LOGLL1t  LGt 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
CUM_LGt-1  0.000164 ** 0.028  0.036982 *** 0.000 
CUM_LL1t-1  0.638411 *** 0.000  -0.984136 *** 0.000 
LOGTCLt  0.015869 *** 0.003  1.241689 *** 0.000 
S_BHHC  0.019882  0.362  -1.712760 *** 0.000 
S_COOP  -0.165532 *** 0.000  1.043624  0.077 
S_MLTC  -0.251571 * 0.094  -6.677946 *** 0.000 
S_REMB  -0.724298 *** 0.000  -5.347768 *** 0.000 
S_SAV  -0.085305 *** 0.003  -1.901822 *** 0.000 
+ country dummies      
Constant  -6.171575 *** 0.000  -3.035463  0.217 
No. of obs.  18,486    19,075   
No. of clusters  8,815    8,946   
Adj. R²  0.451    0.126   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of loan losses in t (LOGLL1), defined as the 
fraction of changes in total loan loss provisions in t over the total amount of customer loans in t-1. Explanatory 
variables are the cumulative loan growth (CUM_LG) in t-1 and the natural logarithm of cumulative loan losses 
(CUM_LL1) in t-1. Cumulative variables equal to the sum of the variable values from t-1, t-2, …, and t-4. We 
control for bank-specific effects using the logarithm of total customer loans (LOGTCL) and indicator dummy 
variables for each bank specialization: Commercial banks form the reference group, whereas Bank Holdings & 
Holding Companies are denoted by S_BHHC=1, Cooperative Banks by S_COOP=1, Medium & Long Term 
Credit Banks by S_MLTC=1, Real Estate / Mortgage Banks by S_REMB=1 and Savings Banks by S_SAV=1. 
We also include country dummies. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust standard errors, controlling 
for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10%-level. 
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Table 11 
Regression results using alternative measures of loan growth 
 
Panel A: Regression results for changes in loan loss provisions 
Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  (1)  Dep. Var.: LOGLL1t  (2) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val. 
LOGLL1t-1  0.602364 *** 0.000  LOGLL1t-1  0.603397 *** 0.000
ALGt-1  -0.000519  0.211  DLGt-1  0.029170 *** 0.000
ALGt-2  0.001332 *** 0.000  DLGt-2  0.019247 ** 0.018
ALGt-3  0.001803 *** 0.000  DLGt-3  0.042362 *** 0.000
ALGt-4  0.000547 ** 0.031  DLGt-4  0.009987  0.194
LOGTCLt  0.003455  0.457  LOGTCLt  0.001250  0.785
GDP_GROWt  -0.064746 *** 0.000  GDP_GROWt  -0.069157 *** 0.000
INT_LONGt  0.334314 *** 0.000  INT_LONGt  0.332463 *** 0.000
+ special./country dummies     + special./country dummies    
Constant  -3.773602 *** 0.000  Constant  -3.735917 *** 0.000
No of obs.  18,283   No of obs.  18,283  
No of clusters  8,718   No of clusters  8,718  
Adj. R²  0.515   Adj. R²  0.515  
 
Panel B: Regression results for the relative gross interest income 
Dep. Var.: ΔRII  (1)  (2) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ALGt  -0.004771 *** 0.000    
DLGt    -0.187881 *** 0.000 
LOGTCLt  0.037314 *** 0.000  0.043973 *** 0.000 
INFLATt  1.012819 *** 0.000  1.012953 *** 0.000 
INT_LONGt  0.821683 *** 0.000  0.811990 *** 0.000 
+ special./country dummies      
Constant  -6.968280 *** 0.000  -6.970459 *** 0.000 
No of obs.  49,907   49,907   
No of clusters  10,228   10,228   
Adj. R²  0.174   0.180   
 
Panel C: Regression results for the equity-to-total-assets ratio 
Dep. Var.: ΔETA  (1)  (2) 
Explanatory Var.  Coeff.  p-val.  Coeff.  p-val. 
ALGt  -0.025152 *** 0.000    
DLGt    -0.328402 *** 0.000 
LOGTCLt  0.084148 *** 0.000  0.074591 *** 0.000 
INFLATt  -0.076355 *** 0.000  -0.069414 *** 0.000 
INT_LONGt  0.000484  0.960  -0.046027 *** 0.000 
+ special./country dummies      
Constant  -0.278580 ** 0.012  -0.053447  0.635 
No of obs.  60,050   60,050   
No of clusters  10,228   10,228   
Adj. R²  0.128   0.042   
 
Notes: These analyses test the robustness of the analyses for hypotheses H1-H3 regarding two alternative 
measures of loan growth: First, ALG is defined as the difference between a bank’s loan growth in year t (LGt) 
and the median of loan growth across all banks in the respective country and year. The alternative measure, 
DLG, takes the value of –1 if LGt was below the 33.3%-quantile (in the lower tercile) of loan growth for all 
banks in the respective country and year, the value of 1 if above the 66.7%-quantile (upper tercile), and the value 
of 0 if in between (mid tercile). Panel A tests H1 and explains the natural logarithm of the ratio of loan losses in t 
(LOGLL1), as defined above, by the lags 1-4 of loan growth (LG), as well as the lagged dependent variable. In 
Panel B (testing H2) and Panel C (testing H3), respectively, the absolute change from t-1 to t of the relative 
interest income (ΔRII), or the absolute change of the equity-to-total-assets ratio (ΔETA) are explained by the 
contemporaneous loan growth rate (LG). In all panels, we control for bank-specific effects using the logarithm of 
total customer loans (LOGTCL) and indicator dummy variables for each bank specialization, as well as for 
macroeconomic effects with the GDP growth rate (GDP_GROW) or the inflation rate (INFLAT), the 10-year 
government bond yield (INT_LONG) and country dummies. P-values are calculated from Huber-White robust 
standard errors, controlling for clustering at individual banks. ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level. 
